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The dilemmas of space appear to lie in the way we relate to it: the 
way we understand and therefore transform, it. The debates between 
absolute and relational space, the dilemma between physical and 
social space, between real and mental space, between space and 
mass, between function and form, between abstract and differential 
space, between space and place, between space and time, can all 
be seen as indicators of a series of open philosophical questions: how 
do we understand space and relate to it? Does it exist beyond our 
cognition or is it conditioned by it? Do we relate to it by our reason 
or our senses? Is space a collection of things and people, a container 
for them, or are they embedded in it? Is it representing openness or 
fixity? Do we understand and transform space individually or social-
ly? How do we relate space and time? In our response to these ques-
tions, we find ourselves divided between rationalism and empiricism, 
between materialism and idealism, between objective and subjec-
tive understanding, between reason and emotion, between theory 
and practice, between uniformity and diversity, and between order 
and disorder. 
(Ali Madanipour, Design of Urban Space 28-29) 
Through her many intriguing novels and film scripts 1, Belen 
Gopegui has established an enviable reputation as one of Spain's 
1 These include: La escala de las mapas (1993), Tocamos la cara (1995), La conquis-
ta del aire (1998)---on which the script for Gerardo Herrero's Las razanes de mis amigos 
(2000) was based, Lo real (2001), El Zada frio de la almohada (2004), and the script for 
Gerardo Herrero's El principio de Arqufmedes (2004). 
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most talented and successful writers of fiction. In fact, her debut 
novel La escala de las mapas (1993) won the «Premio Tigre Juan» 
in 1993 and the «Premio Iberoamericano de Primeras Novelas» in 
1994. This important novel itself blurs the boundaries between fic-
tion and essay building on a long-standing critical and philosophi-
cal tradition of Hispanic fiction -recalling such important works 
as Miguel de Unamuno's Amory pedagog{a (1902) and Juan Benet's 
narratives of the Civil War starting with Volveras a Region (1967), 
among many others. More than just a prize-winning story, Gopegui's 
Janus-faced narrative investigates the fictional world of its narra-
tor-protagonist Sergio Prim at the same time that it examines the 
philosophical underpinnings of our treatment of geographical space 
-proving to be an insightful look into the intimate connection be-
tween mental and cartographic space. In effect, the work responds 
to a current methodological crisis in geography focusing on how 
space is produced- a crisis that has divided unflinching material-
ists from entrenched immaterialists (as the recent pages of Progress 
in Human Geography testify). Reconciling both approaches with one 
another, and finding the inadequacies inherent in each, La escala 
de las mapas asserts that a thorough answer to our interrogations 
of space must acknowledge «a notion of the material that admits 
from the very start the presence and importance of the immateri-
al» (703), as Alan Latham and Derek McCormack express so suc-
cinctly in their article «Moving Cities: Rethinking the Materialities 
of Urban Geographies» (2004). Gopegui's novel proposes that we 
question the notion of an objective and static geographically spa-
tial dimension and, in so doing, underscores an idea most clearly 
articulated in Henri Lefebvre's watershed opus The Production of 
Space ( 1991) 2• The novelist leads the reader precisely towards the 
Lefebvrian idea of space as a process that envelops both the notion 
of materiality and that of immaterialty. I argue that an awareness 
of Henri Bergson's philosophical writings on space, time and con-
sciousness -and the relevance of those writings to Lefebvre's pro-
ject- most clearly illuminates the novel's contribution to this un-
derstanding of a simultaneously mental and cartographic spatiality. 
In apparently juxtaposing Sergio Prim, the interval-seeking nar-
rator and Brezo Varela, his unattainable love, Gopegui's novel sets 
2 Lefebvre's work has influenced many more contemporary thinkers such as David 
Hanrey (1989; 1990; 1996; 2000), Edward Soja (1996), Michael Dear (2000), Ali Mada-
nipour (1996), Don Mitchell (2000), and David Thorns (2002) among many others. 
-8-
ON MENTAL AND CARTOGRAPHIC SPACE: BELEN GOPEGUI'S LA ESCALA DE LOS MAPAS 
up a straw-man philosophical dichotomy between affect and action, 
between subjectivity and objectivity, between the purely theoretical 
poles of ideal and real consciousness, ultimately to affirm Bergson's 
maxim that «all consciousness is something» over Edmund Husserl's 
weakened version - «all consciousness is consciousness of some-
thing» (Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 56). More impor-
tantly, the Bergsonian idea that existence is an unceasing movement 
occurring in an ever-expanding duration takes shape amidst a dis-
course of geographical processes and scales centered on Madrid. 
Gopegui's resulting elegant take on the production of space high-
lights the notion of spatial process as a movement at once material 
and symbolic, with implications regarding whose mental maps 
achieve cartographic form. Ultimately the novel successfully nego-
tiates those very questions important to the study of cultural and 
urban geography -inquiring into the very nature of space as well 
as the method through which space is simultaneously shaped by 
both action and thought itself. 
Although I will focus more specifically on the link that Gopegui's 
text realizes with questions of cultural geography, the present exami-
nation of novelistic form and philosophical methodology is meant to 
evoke larger questions of perception and even consciousness itself. The 
questions that Bergson asked of consciousness through his works are 
by no means relegated to the dustbin of the history of philosophy, but 
are themselves indicative of the enduring nature of the Bergsonian 
conception of past itself. In an article that appeared in the New York 
Review of Books (January 15, 2004) titled «In the River of Conscious-
ness», Neurologist Oliver Sacks, in fact, returns to Bergson's Creative 
Evolution ( 1907) in order to explore the renewed interest in theories 
of perception which posit a discontinuous apprehension of reality 3• As 
3 This philosophical problem of the discontinuous apprehension of reality is at 
the core of Bergson's writings. This spatialization of reality is in fact the tendency of 
life which has obtained evolutionarily in the function of the human intellect (although 
as he explains as part of both in Creative Evolution and Matter and Memory this ten-
dency exists in the whole of duration itself). As Bergson explains, this spatialization 
is caused by the fact that the human intellect has continuously molded itself to matter. 
My more-than-passing interest in the writings of Sacks leads me to suggest that the 
whole of Sack's approach to the mind-body-world problem squares quite well not 
only with phenomenological philosophy and psychology but perhaps more specifi-
cally with the writings of Bergson on consciousness. To explore this connection more 
adequately, however, would be to adopt quite a different focus than that of the 
present article. Nevertheless, let me conclude this diversion by stating that there is 
still support Bergson's musings on memory (see McNamara 1996). Readers may wish 
to consult the discussion on Sacks's article by Benjamin Libet et al. and also appear-
ing in the New York Review of Books, April 8, 2004. 
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Sacks, Bergson and Gopegui are aware, however, admitting that we 
may perceive reality in a discontinuous manner does not mean that 
reality is itself discontinuous. Rather, our experience in and produc-
tion of a shared reality is tied in great measure to our perception of 
the world through static images, models and mechanisms. La escala 
de las mapas seeks to draw attention to the way these mechanisms 
influence our understanding and production of personal, social and 
even urban space. 
In the first section of this essay I will show how the novel sets 
up the binary structure of subjectivity and objectivity, of affect vs. 
action, through the characters Sergio and Brezo, respectively the 
literary representations of these oppositions. I will then explore the 
Bergsonian metaphor of the cinematograph of the mind as it pre-
sents itself in the text in order to draw attention to the false divi-
sions created by the mind -divisions which for Bergson are the very 
essence of a false spatiality abstracted from and imagined as dis-
tinct from temporality. Subsequently I will show how, through the 
concept of the «intervalo» or «hueco», Gopegui constructs a narra-
tive attentive to the problem of uniting affect and materiality and 
yet unwilling to accept the very way this question is posed. The pro-
tagonist's conception of a space between the mental and the carto-
graphic illustrates what for Bergson is a spatializing tendency of 
perception. Notably, Gopegui's novel reveals the insufficiency of this 
tendency much as the philosopher's auvre does. Moreover, I will 
emphasize that the geographical content of the novel highlights the 
appropriate application of Bergson's ideas on space to geography. 
Ultimately, the triple fusion of Gopegui's La escala de las mapas, 
Bergson's philosophy, and the theoretical foundations of cultural 
geography form a unique call for the way in which we perceive 
space, now neither wholly mental nor purely cartographic, but a 
process from which the human intellect extracts either one or the 
other, forming those very simplistic dichotomies that drive the nov-
elistic Sergio Prim to anguish. 
SERGIO AND BREZO, A PHILOSOPHICAL LOVE AFFAIR BETWEEN CONSCIOUSNESS 
AND THINGS 
Simply put, La escala de las mapas is the story of geographer 
Sergio Prim's longing for his love interest, Brezo Varela, also a ge-
ographer. The former character documents his yearning through a 
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continual surge of emotions, thoughts and memories, ultimately 
seeking a gap in space through which he would be able to finally 
connect with the object of his passions. These memories, thoughts 
and emotions all but completely eclipse the action of the novel un-
derstood in the traditional sense of a sequence of events. This is a 
direct result of the narrator's (Sergio) clear desire to immerse him-
self in his own ruminations at the expense of the world around him. 
In the last chapter he clearly reveals how he has been attempting 
to hide from reality -«Brezo, aunque la realidad me busque, no 
podra dar conmigo. Para esconderse, ahora lo entiendo, conviene 
elegir el sitio donde nadie supondria que nos ibamos a esconder» 
(229). It is somewhat problematic to summarize the plot of Gope-
gui's novel further for the reader. This difficulty is not solely a func-
tion, as I will have chance to explore, of the narrator's insistence 
upon what might all too easily be termed mental or psychic activity 
-the constant flux of emotions and memories that pervade and 
organize the work- although this is perhaps the primary obstacle. 
Rather, creating a short synopsis of the work is made more com-
plex by the text's nuanced and clever narrative structure. At the risk 
of introducing this narrative complexity before it is entirely appro-
priate to do so, let it suffice to state that the novel's action -the 
part that exceeds the protagonist's important mental involutions-
is to be read only secondarily, and that the largely (but not wholly) 
first-person narrative style precludes a so-called 'direct' apprehen-
sion of the novel's events taken in the widest sense. In lieu of a 
chapter-by-chapter summary of the work, then, I hope to give a sense 
of its trajectory by means of the text's presentation of its major char-
acters through the philosophical opposition of reality to ideality. This 
opposition, as I will show, is undeniably emphasized throughout the 
wprk -and yet as I will argue, the effect of the novel is ultimately 
to question this dichotomization. 
Few previous studies have taken on the complex philosophical 
core of La escala de las mapas 4• When the novel has been mentioned 
it has proved tempting to limit discussion of the novel's two (neces-
sarily one-dimensional) protagonists to notions of fixed dichotomies. 
One such example is to be found in Janet Perez's «Tradition, Reno-
vation, Innovation: The Novels of Belen Gopegui» (2003). The crit-
4 Nevertheless, Judith Drinkwater (1995) unites body and space in an excellent 
reading of the novel as part of her essay. 
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ic sets out to explain Gopegui's novels, including La escala de las 
mapas, in terms of «the dichotomy of dreams or illusion versus re-
ality» (128). She explicitly calls attention to problems of ontology, 
and shows convincingly how one or another of these poles come to 
be predominant in the novels under consideration, thusly finding 
the novel to be examined here an example in which idealism ob-
scures realism. Yet, I would like to expand Perez's discussion of 
ontology in order to focus on the very division between the real and 
the ideal. In ignoring that this dichotomy is created by a certain 
tendency of the intellect, the split serves to affirm the ontological 
status of its avatars, namely affect/action and mental/cartographic 
space. This limitation ignores that Gopegui's novel indeed seeks to 
challenge these very boundaries, and thus leads to the mistaken 
conclusions that «Readers have no objective external referent, no 
third-person omniscient narrator, no other narrative voice or char-
acter's judgment to help them distinguish between what happens in 
reality and what exists only in the mind of the protagonist» (120) 
and «Although Gopegui presents the urban landscape in realistic 
fashion together with contemporary social and historical attributes 
of the metropolis, interaction between this setting and the charac-
ters of La escala is minimal: the important 'action' is psychic, oc-
curring largely within enclosed spaces, often within the characters 
themselves» (119). I disagree, and would offer that these conclusions 
are in fact already given at the moment one severs affect from ac-
tion, internal mind from external reality, memory from matter. 
On the contrary, releasing these constructed separations, and 
finding the complex cohabitation of one in the other provided by 
Bergson's phenomenology, reveals the text as a rich commentary on 
reality, on matter, and on the production of space. In Matter and 
Memory ( 1896) Bergson writes on the inadequacy of the real/ideal 
dichotomy: 
The realist starts, in fact, from the universe, that is to say from 
an aggregate of images governed, as to their mutual relations, 
by fixed laws, in which effects are in strict proportion to their 
causes, and of which the character is an absence of center, all 
the images unfolding on one and the same plane infinitely 
prolonged. But he is at once bound to recognize that, besides 
this system, there are perceptions, that is to say, systems in 
which these same images seem to depend on a single one 
among them, around which they arrange themselves on dif-
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ferent planes, so as to be wholly transformed by the slightest 
modification of this central image. Now this perception is just 
what the idealist starts from: in the system of images which 
he adopts there is a privileged image, his body, by which the 
other images are conditioned. But as soon as he attempts to 
connect the present with the past and to foretell the future, 
he is obliged to abandon this central position, to replace all the 
images on the same plane, to suppose that they no longer vary 
for him, but for themselves and to treat them as though they 
made part of a system in which every change gives the exact 
measure of its cause. (14-15) 
Bergson argues that these two poles of consciousness, the real and 
the ideal, the consciousness in things and the consciousness in living 
beings as indeterminate centers of action, are necessarily and inti-
mately connected. This relationality becomes concretely symbolic in 
Gopegui's work through the two characters, Sergio and Brezo, whose 
relationship is a literary metaphor for that very relation between the 
consciousness of things and the consciousness of living beings. 
As is made quite clear in the text, Sergio represents the pole of 
ideality, an abstracted, receptive center of affect; Brezo is the pole 
of reality, the distant center of indeterminate action. Sergio Prim is 
identified with the pole of ideality through metaphors that weaken 
his physical, and thus corporeal, real presence. He is described as 
«pequefio» (19, 145). His body is puny, weak and «casi ficticio» (12-
13). He is «un hombre tan pasivo» (38). Metaphors of interiority 
heighten this identification. His narrative is filled with memories, 
he seeks mental escape (52), seeks to «recolectar imagenes» (70) as 
an outward projection of his internal memory collector, he envies 
the action of his peers (51), he is «un ser de emoci6n (53). The text 
underlines his «intimidad poblada» (87) in opposition to «los cuer-
pos venidos del exterior» (20-21). He is a small Sergio (65) a Sergio 
«imaginario» (65) who prefers to surround himself with «una difu-
sa constelaci6n afectiva» (29). Though he lives in affect, he is un-
able to exteriorize his feelings or to act (27, 153). His movement in 
space is clumsy (23), he doesn't calculate the distance between him-
self and objects well (44), and not surprisingly he is «el (mico estu-
diante de geografia que no le gustaba viajar» (44). He even rants 
against materiality explicitly: 
Contra la fisiologia. Contra esta humana dependencia de ser 
abrazado, tocado, lamido con minuscula delicadeza por una 
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lengua exacta. Me gustaria escribir contra la fisiologia, porque 
la fisiologia es imposible. No quiero salir a la vida, no quiero 
bajar a las tiendas a comprar latas ni arroz, tu eres mi con-
cha, Brezo, quiero quedarme en ti. (58) 
His lack of camaraderie with material things is revealed in his need 
for glasses to focus or magnify the physical world (21) and the cen-
trifugal connection he has with reality within which he feels the 
sensation of smoke before noticing others smoking (21) - affect and 
sensation before perception. His is not the world of things but that 
of his own «feraces jardines imaginarios, el ensuefio» (62). His is a 
universe closed and enveloped by an affect that desires itself: «que 
mi pasi6n no se repliegue, amiga, que mi pasi6n fluya por un espa-
cio blanco y libre de realidad, por esta ruta apaisada que voy tra-
zando» (91). In many instances he explicitly opposes himself to re-
ality (87, 102, 105, 138, 172). He is the second half of the book title 
he shows Brezo: La realidad y el deseo (30), a being of desire living 
in «el peligroso mundo de las sensaciones» (170) as his boss Dofia 
Elena describes it. He toys with the intellect itself as others might 
play chess (51), needing of course no physical pieces. 
Likewise, Brezo Varela is the abstracted pole of reality, move-
ment, action upon things. Her materiality is expressed in the phys-
ical term of 'agility' ( 16, 19); she needs to know the whereabouts of 
things (87). Sergio notes that «[Brezo,] tu mandas sobre los objetos» 
(152). She is the reality opposed to Sergio's musings on Berkeley's 
idealist philosophy (89, 135, 155, 169). Sergio describes her as ac-
tion incarnate: 
El mundo quiere pruebas, flor traida del duefio, dinosaurio. El 
mundo, por lo general, detesta la ret6rica, desconfia de los 
verbos mentales: recordar, creer, pensar, suponer, fantasear, 
representarse. Esas gentes extravertidas que atruenan con su 
claridad en absoluto prestan oidos a la imaginaci6n. El mun-
do y tu, Brezo, que estabas en el mundo, exigiais actos, estabais 
en tratos con la realidad. (my emphasis, 183) 
His association to intellectual verbs such as «to remember», «to 
believe», «to think», «to suppose», «to fantasize» and «to represent» 
contrasts with Brezo's links with reality, actions, and the world. Due 
to his imprisonment is his own mind, his perception cannot capture 
real movement but rather only catches a jump shot of Brezo's ac-
tion in the world: «En el ultimo rinc6n estabas tu, pero ya te habias 
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levantado, venias hacia mi» (26). By the time he mentally captures 
and processes Brezo's location at one instant, she has already moved 
to another. She is a corporeal presence identified with objective 
things, supposedly uninflected by that desire to which Sergio clings. 
In the following quotation, Brezo is clearly identified with this phys-
ical movement, while Sergio links himself instead with mental flow: 
Brezo, tu eres el enfasis que no tuve, eres la alacridad puesta 
delante de mi monotonia. Yo soy un hombre introvertido, ma-
nantial subterraneo, corriente prisionera, mientras que tu, ca-
tarata, te extroviertes pintando de blanco empapado fragmen-
tos de la atm6sfera. Tu desconoces la palabra reserva, el acto 
de acumular imagenes, emociones para el inviemo. (59) 
Brezo is not equipped to express emotions, but rather only «un re-
lato inconexo de su vida sentimental» (64). 
Together, Sergio and Brezo represent in human sexual union the 
relational union of material and idea, «yo era lo ajeno, y ella me 
habitaba» (20), «Ella existi6 en mi» (19). Problems between the two, 
often glossed in terms of communication, engender the encounter 
between the mental and the material. Sergio «exigia que el gesto 
ratificara siempre al sentimiento, que el enunciado fuera reproduc-
ci6n exacta del mensaje interior» (89) while Brezo's connection with 
the sentimental remains unexplored. Sergio is thus imagined as a 
subjective experience cut off in many ways from action itself while 
Brezo is pure movement, lack of reflection and sensation. The ideal 
consciousness that presents itself in the human organism as a center 
of indetermination or a screen between received action and its cor-
responding delayed action (Sergio) contrasts with the real con-
sciousness of things themselves, discussed by Bergson as a plane of 
images where each interacts with all the others constantly on all of 
their sides (Brezo). If the realization of this theoretical model is 
problematized through the appearance of each pole in a distinct 
novelistic human consciousness this is only an effect of the literary 
metaphor that Gopegui employs to represent the cohabitation of 
real and ideal consciousnesses on what Deleuze, following Bergson's 
nondualistic ontology, terms the 'plane of immanence' through a 
human relationship. 
That their relationship is a failure is attributed to the fact that 
the pole of individual consciousness has been cut off from action. 
The implication is that to give in to affect, or to sever affect from 
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action is to attempt to interrupt the ever-changing flow that is du-
ration. It is not that affect without action is not real. In fact, un-
dermining Sergio's own implicit claims to the contrary, the reader 
is convinced that affect as expressed by Sergio's self-absorbed nar-
rative has very real properties (and one cannot exist without the 
other). Rather, as Lefevbre's (1991) triadic model of the production 
of space outlines, space is experienced, perceived and conceived 
-spatial practices, representations of space and spaces of represen-
tation all engender the real movement of spatial processes (33). 
There is no thought without action, no action without thought. 
Sergio and Brezo are thus necessary foils for one another, whose 
separation illustrates the practice of a false spatiality described by 
Bergson in Creative Evolution (1907) using the metaphor of the «cin-
ematograph of the mind.» 
THE INTERNAL CINEMATOGRAPH OF THE MIND 
Bergson argues in Creative Evolution ( 1907) that the function 
of the human intellect, of a necessarily «spatial» character, is to 
insert indeterminate action into the continual movement of experi-
ence. This is done by fragmentation, as this oft-quoted passage ex-
plains: 
We take snapshots, as it were, of the passing reality, and, as 
these are characteristic of the reality, we have only to string 
them on a becoming, abstract, uniform and invisible, situated 
at the back of the apparatus of knowledge, in order to imitate 
what there is that is characteristic in this becoming itself. Per-
ception, intellection, language so proceed in general. Whether 
we would think becoming, or express it, or even perceive it, we 
hardly do anything else than set going a kind of cinemato-
graph inside us. We may therefore sum up what we have been 
saying in the conclusion that the mechanism of our ordinary 
knowledge is of a cinematographical kind. (original emphasis, 
306) 
Nevertheless, as Bergson emphasizes, matter does not present itself 
as fragmented snapshots. These intellect-snapshots divide the flow 
of movement, separating qualities from things from actions, adjec-
tives from nouns from verbs, affect from action and thought from 
the material world (298-304). Bergson shows that qualities fade into 
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other qualities, that thingness vanishes, that adjectives and nouns 
thus cannot capture movement. He writes in Matter and Memory 
(1896) that affect is a material process, that centripetal and cen-
trifugal movements of the nervous system are continuous and that 
the brain merely introduces an interval between the two in order to 
act. This interval, this cinematographic character of the intellect, 
this tendency, however practical it may be considered, to introduce 
separations into what is but flux is what readers of Bergson may 
recognize as the «spatialization of time», a notion which the phi-
losopher never ceases to denounce, but which is just as frequently 
misunderstood as it is recognized. The prevalence of references to 
the cinema in the novel makes clear Sergio's mania to divide and 
to «spatialize», thus abstracting objectivity from subjectivity and 
closing off action from affect. At the same time, these references 
lead the wary reader, or that familiar with Bergson's phenomenolo-
gy, to question such easy compartmentalizations. The cinema thus 
appears explicitly in the novel in three ways: as seemingly trifling 
detail, as symbol for memory and most of all as structure -the lat-
ter paradoxically evocative of Bergsonism. 
As detail, it deceptively appears to warrant little attention. Ser-
gio describes a kiss from Brezo to her father as a « beso de cine 
mudo» (43), her haircut as «su peinado de actriz de cine» (53) and 
her gait as «una invenci6n cinematografica» (82). He seeks asylum 
in the «sombras m6viles de una pelicula» (48) and laments the times 
when «no habia cine» (SO) while Brezo works «el cine» innocuous-
ly into a conversation about one of the many avatars of the «hueco» 
to be discussed below (55). Other seemingly innocuous appearanc-
es of the cinema are frequent throughout the novel as Sergio in-
dexes it in recalling names of screen Indians (34), comparing the 
size of a window to a movie-screen (112), ruling out future meet-
ing places for Brezo and himself ( 1 77), and foretelling his own dis-
appearance (229). 
Yet Sergio's referencing of the cinema is not limited to such 
seemingly insignificant details. A more technical cinematic vocabu-
lary finds its place in his description of moving light on the shower 
curtain as «sucesi6n de fotogramas» (59). The cinema becomes 
equated with the mind through its use as a metaphor for human 
perception and memory, recalling Bergson's denouncement of the 
cinematic apparatus. Consider Sergio's meditation that «el hombre 
es un ser con dificultades para la comunicaci6n, muere con su 
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pelicula de sensaciones detras de la frente» (180-81), or the use of 
the phrase «el proyector de su pelicula daba marcha atras» (42) as 
a segue into Brezo's memories as perceived by Sergio-narrador. Else-
where he mentions that her eyes «contemplaban una filmografia 
interior» (56). Note the language used in his dream that «la pelicu-
la de tus deseos y la de mis carencias, ambas han dejado de rodar» 
(194). Sergio insists that reality «[t]iene vfsceras corrientes, lacias 
mejillas que el celuloide no refleja. Su vida, en fin, depende del pro-
yector que suena como lluvia, de la oscuridad de la sala, de la cor-
riente electrica. Y hay tantos cines, Brezo, y es tan raro que mis 
imagenes coincidan con las tuyas» (224). In novelistic expression of 
Bergson's cinematograph of the mind as false spatiality, for Sergio 
the perception of each individual is thus likened to a cinematic 
apparatus. Sergio's unfulfilled longing for connection is phrased in 
precisely these terms, reinforcing the metaphor: «c6mo va a incor-
porar [a un individuo] sobre su corta cinta, sobre su sino nada du-
radero, una pelicula ajena» (181). 
Yet if the cinema is associated with division and separation for 
Sergio, as well as for the Bergson of Creative Evolution, the reader 
must be more attentive to discern the cinematic structure which 
pervades the novel. Understanding this structure calls for a recu-
peration of the cinema from Bergson's derision in order to under-
stand how the philosopher might have better used it to his advan-
tage 5• As Sergei Eisenstein said, one must remember that the cinema 
is not only the camera but also montage. It is the juxtaposition of 
images -it is collision. As Pier Paolo Pasolini (1988) has shown, it 
is also the semi-subjective; it is the visual and auditory representa-
5 In this way, it is unfortunate that Bergson denounced the cinema when later he 
might have learned to praise it. This is in fact Deleuze's argument in Cinema 1: The 
Movement-Image (1-3). Fragmenting a real movement at a rate of 24 per second, the 
frames of the cinematic apparatus cannot themselves reproduce this real movement 
as a whole. Between every two frames there are an infinite number of intermediary 
frames not captured by the camera. It is for this reason that the Bergson of Creative 
Evolution had decried the cinematic apparatus as illusion, but as Deleuze asserts, it 
is the projection of the frames that restore (albeit through an illusion) to the cap-
tured movement its real continuity. Attempting to explain the contradiction between 
Bergson's philosophical tenets and his rejection of the cinema, Deleuze writes: «The 
essence of a thing never appears at the outset, but in the idle, in the course of its 
development, when its strength is assured. Having transformed philosophy by pos-
ing the question of the 'new' instead of that of eternity (how are the production and 
appearance of something new possible?), Bergson knew this better than anyone. For 
example, he said that the novelty of life could not appear when it began, since when 
it began life was forced to imitate matter ... Is it not the same with the cinema?» (3). 
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tion of the free indirect discourse (see Voloshinov 1973) analyzed 
by Bakhtin in the written text of the nineteenth century Russian 
novel. The cinema gives this discourse enunciation through the osci-
llation between subjective and objective poles, or by a camera that 
is neither within nor outside of the character but merely with him 
or her. It is evident that what Pasolini understands as the semi-sub-
jective has much to do with Bergson's phenomenological rejection 
of the purity of such notions as reality and ideality. In La escala de 
las mapas, a markedly non-homogenous narrative style that turns 
unceasingly from the first person 'Sergio-yo' to the third person 
'Sergio-el' and back again betrays both Sergio's feelings of isolation 
as well as the concomitant philosophical concepts of fixity and 
closed systems. Although it is beyond the scope of this essay to 
assess the frequency of these twists and turns, the following excerpt 
may be taken as typical: 
Brezo, mi vida estuvo llena de cifras inexactas, me confundia 
en las sumas, tachaba y era en vano, los errores nos siguen 
siempre. De un lado estaba Sergio e iba perdiendo cabellos, 
peones, torres; del otro, la realidad intacta, sedienta. Fue cuan-
do subiste a mi casa [ ... ] Pude haber eludido tu presencia [ ... ] 
Pude haber permanecido solo [ ... ]. (my emphasis, 87) 
It is certainly possible to believe that this narratological choice is 
best interpreted as the self-speech of a disturbed individual who 
describes himself in the third-person and not, in fact, as the near-
cinematic oscillation between subjective and objective perception. 
Yet to do so would be to deny, on the whole, not only the preva-
lence of the cinematic indexing described above, but also the very 
prevalent philosophical concern of the novel. This concern is the 
investigation of the connection between desire and reality, between 
inner and outer space, between affect and action, all implicitly me-
diated through the relationship Sergio-Brezo. 
As a whole, then, the cinematic indexing and semi-subjective 
narration work together to posit various dualities, the juxtaposition 
of affect and action as well as that of real and ideal consciousness, 
and then record their collision. Just as in Matter and Memory Berg-
son is interested neither in pure perception nor pure memory but 
their cohabitating indiscernibility, just as he merely abstracts affect 
from action for theoretical reasons and then joins them as part of 
an indivisible movement, here Gopegui's work is focused neither on 
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Sergio nor Brezo, but on their connection. This connection, the goal 
of the first-person narrator's search, is imagined as a space. Within 
the confines of his mind, and with cinematic imagery, Sergio imag-
ines that he invites Brezo into that space: «ven y quedate conmigo 
entre la gota de luz y la pantalla» (42). This is metaphorically the 
Bergsonian gap between action and reaction formed by the human 
brain, the theoretical meeting place of real with ideal consciousness. 
This is the point of collision that expresses Sergio's desire to con-
nect with Brezo. This is the interval. It is in reference to this con-
cept, one which is all too easily misunderstood, that Bergson's work 
most illuminates my reading of La escala de las mapas and provides 
a subsequent necessary correction to the philosophical basis of cur-
rent explorations in cultural geography. 
INTERVAL, THE SPACE BETWEEN THE LIGHT AND THE SCREEN 
The prevalence of the idea of the interval as a space between in 
the novel, as a nexus between affect and action, as a gap or a space 
betwixt and between desire and reality, between ideal and real con-
sciousness, testifies to the power of Sergio's mistaken spatialization 
of flow, a process of division whose over-application Bergson de-
nounces as the tendency of the intellect (Matter and Memory). It is 
the goal of the novel's protagonist to inhabit this gap, thereby be-
ing able to transmit emotion into action, a possible connection 
manifested through the amorous relationship between Brezo and 
himself. 
From the first chapter, Sergio's obsession with the opening crank 
or «manivela» of a window (9, 88, 168, 216-17, 227) becomes a 
metaphor for the interval between himself as a creature of affect 
and an outer reality. This gap, also a connection, is more ubiqui-
tously referred to as a «hueco» and even explicitly, in some cases, 
an «intervalo», though it is elsewhere described in terms of «paus-
as», «fallas» and is implicit in recurrent symbolism of portals such 
as windows and doors 6. If Bergson comments that «[t]here are in-
6 As «hueco» on 11, 13, 80, 82, 90-91, 101, 106, 109, 111, 116, 120-122, 125, 137, 
141, 148, 156-57, 153, 160, 164-68, 170, 174, 176, 179, 183, 191-92, 196, 199-200, 205, 
207, 210, 218-19, 227 and 229; as «intervalo» on 85, 120-122, 139, 159, 173, 176 and 
229. The explicit source given in the text for the use of the word interval is Nabok-
ov's Ada o el ardor which Sergio finds it necessary to quote at greater length than 
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tervals of silence between sounds» (Matter and Memory, 259), Ser-
gio complements this with a quotation from Debussy «La musica 
no esta en las notas, sino entre las notas» (55). Sergio, then, is seek-
ing this gap, as he terms it «un puente levadizo [ ... ] un lugar sus-
pendido entre dos mundos, el de la desnudez [el material] y el otro 
[el ideal]» (26). The «hueco» is «el espacio que va desde la acci6n 
del uno al sentimiento del otro: un tramo firme, un puente no in-
consutil sino hecho de s6lido granito transitable» (my emphasis, 
157). Through this utopian gap the isolated protagonist hopes to 
access a world he considers to be outside of himself. 
For Sergio, this idea of the hueco, the space between, comes into 
being to correct a teratological error of a spatializing intellect. In-
stead of renouncing this intellect (through a method akin to Berg-
son's) and recovering the phenomenological ground of existence, 
that is, instead of recovering the indivisible presence of the objec-
tive in the subjective and likewise of the subjective in the objective, 
Gopegui's protagonist follows the tendency of intellect and creates 
yet another abstraction. This need to partition space calls his atten-
tion to the «margin» -a mystical number situated between seven 
and eight discovered in Cadiz in the XVIth century (27-28), to the 
birthday gift that a young Brezo asks her father for- «una barra 
espaciadora [ ... ] que sirva para la vida. Si yo la aprieto dentro del 
cine, por ejemplo, empiecen a aparecer asientos vacios entre mi 
butaca y la de al lado» (55). The «hueco» is, of course, a symbol for 
the relationship between Sergio and Brezo themselves. It is «un 
lugar de descanso en donde transcurrir contigo sin cometer equiv-
ocaciones» (90), «el canal que comunica los objetos entre si» (91). 
Yet Sergio's greatest error is assuming that the «hueco» really 
exists as he perceives it -that is, as a space in between things. One 
of the core assertions of Bergson's philosophy is precisely that space 
between things is a view taken by mind, and that we err in limiting 
our conception of the universe to this view. Bergson's first thesis in 
Matter and Memory is that one cannot equate a movement with the 
what appears below: «No los golpes recurrentes del ritmo sino el vacio que separa 
dos de esos golpes, el hueco gris entre las notas negras, el Tierno Intevalo. La pul-
saci6n misma no hace sino recordar la pobre idea de medida, pero entre dos pulsa-
ciones acecha algo que se parece al verdadero Tiempo» (my emphasis, 120). It is not 
out of place to say that Gopegui's Sergio sees in Nabokov's Van Veen a fellow entity 
of affect, a memory-diver whose ability to feel and think also heavily outweighs his 
ability to act. 
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distance covered by that movement7. As Bernard Pullman's exhaus-
tive work The Atom in the History of Human Thought (2001) ex-
plores, since Democritus the idea that space is empty and that small 
atoms move within it has held intermittent sway in the philosophy 
of the material world. Yet Sergio's insistence that there is a hueco 
between an atom and an electron (102) has given way in the twen-
tieth century to the quantum acknowledgement that energy is ei-
ther a wave or a particle, depending how you set up the experiment. 
An electron follows no set path but is now discussed as an electron 
cloud following a model that rejects the spatializing metaphors of 
an outdated science. Quantum theorists, notably David Bohm 
(1983; 1994; 1998; Krishnamurti & Bohm 1985; 1999), challenging 
traditional physicists now embrace the idea that space is full and 
not empty, an immense background of energy upon which materi-
ality in our conception of the term is a mere surface disturbance. 
This idea is not so far from the suggestion of the novel itself. In 
fact, in a moment of lucidity, Sergio tells himself that it the «hueco» 
is only a metaphor (137). This is exactly what Bergson tells us 
-that although in one sense language makes a community of ac-
tion possible, it allows us to erroneously separate the continuous 
flow within space into qualities (adjectives), things (nouns) and mo-
vements (verbs) when there is only movement, only change itself. 
There is no empty space between objects. Sergio misunderstands the 
continuity of space and instead believes in the body as ontological-
ly-given separator of affect and action. Yet, instead, as Bergson 
notes, perception is virtual action, and affect is real action occur-
ring where it is felt. Movement is continuous, and the body is one 
of many abstractions that can never, in realty, be separated from 
the system of images that interact each on the others on all their 
sides simultaneously. From Sergio's perspective, this remark that the 
7 The proof of this assertion lies in the deconstruction of Zeno's example of Achil-
les and the tortoise. If Achilles runs ten times faster than the tortoise, and the tor-
toise is given a ten-meter head start, then by the time Achilles runs the initial ten 
meters, the tortoise will have moved another 1/10 meter. When Achilles runs the 1/10 
meter, the tortoise will have moved another 1/100 m. and so on. Thus, Zeno con-
cludes, Achilles will never catch up with the tortoise. Nevertheless, and as Bergson 
correctly assumes, the flaw in this reasoning is that while the space traveled may be 
divisible, the movement is not. Movement cannot be equated to the distance cov-
ered because it is pure duration, continual becoming, the eternal moment where the 
past bleeds into, even recreates itself in, the present. Achilles will indeed surpass 
the tortoise. 
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«hueco» does not exist conveys his doubt that he will ever be able 
to negotiate the gap between affect and action, and in fact he will 
not, provided he persists in his divisive intellectual oppositions. 
Moreover, Bergson's implication that the barriers between inner 
and outer space are not strong ones is mirrored in the text subtly, 
in details that consistently evade Sergio's conscious knowledge. Not 
until late in the book does he admit his «problemas limitrofes» (209). 
After a conversation with his psychologist's secretary, he takes of-
fense at her desire to continue working instead of chatting with him. 
This moment delivers a notable shock to his fixed ideas of limits, 
«[E]ntre el punto donde aquella mujer pronunci6 la ironia y el punto 
donde la recibi, no habia separaci6n. Me senti maltratado de re-
pente. Como un pequefio animal retractil, sin membrana, soy. Y por 
eso mi coraz6n se encoge, es un calambre de coraz6n que duele, y 
tu percibes mi dolor, y por eso resulta tan dificil relacionarse conm-
igo» (my emphasis, 209). Questioning that which he has taken for 
granted at other times in the novel, he asks dofia Elena, his boss, 
«('.d6nde esta el limite entre la vida exterior y la interior?» (169). 
Similarly, windows consistently evoke the «delgado limite [ ... ] entre 
los radiadores y el mundo, entre la habitaci6n concreta y el exteri-
or oscuro, interminable» (113), a stand-in for the meeting place of 
affect-action. His disappearance at the end of the novel, presuma-
bly into the «hueco», into the very spaces between the words of his 
memoir (229), indicates that his problem has not been caused by 
an inability to relate to his environment, but rather by renouncing 
himself to a debilitatingly-advanced affective sense. It is precisely 
that the inner and outer worlds are too connected, and not that they 
might not be connected enough, that causes his anguish. Bergson 
is right: 
[a] body, that is, an independent material object, presents it-
self at first to us as a system of qualities in which resistance 
and colour -the data of sight and touch- occupy the centre, 
all the rest being, as it were, suspended from them. On the 
other hand, the data of sight and touch are those which most 
obviously have extension in space, and the essential character 
of space is continuity. There are intervals of silence between 
sounds, for the sense of hearing is not always occupied; be-
tween odours, between tastes, there are gaps, as though the 
senses of smell and taste only functioned accidentally: as soon 
as we open our eyes, on the contrary, the whole field of vision 
takes on colour; and, since solids are necessarily in contact 
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with each other, our touch must follow the surface or the edg-
es of objects without ever encountering a true interruption. 
(Matter and Memory, 259-60) 
Not only are all things in space connected with no gaps, but also 
sensation, just as perception, is extensive, only that it takes place 
inside the body where it is felt (Matter and Memory, 45-49). Sergio 
sees barriers where there are only transitions, staticity where there 
is only constant movement and change in the whole. His feelings 
are real, yet he is incapable of turning affect into action. This is of 
course one of the primary problems facing urban studies, how to 
create spaces of hope (Harvey 2000), how to combat the uneven 
geographical distribution of a pernicious capitalism and assure «the 
right to the city» (Lefebvre 1968; Mitchell 2003). 
GEOGRAPHICAL BERGSONIANISM, MENTAL AND CARTOGRAPHIC SPACE 
In the novel, the interplay between Sergio and Brezo, between 
affect and action, evokes another movement between mental and 
cartographic space, between physical and mental maps (56, 88). 
Without collapsing idealism and realism, without sacrificing idea to 
action, Gopegui's novel articulates the link between the two in purely 
geographic terms. The book's spatial vocabulary leaves no mental 
or physical state untouched. Sergio imagines that his interior world 
will grow «como peninsula emanada, como margen de rio o bastion 
inatacado por los otros» (87). He is Castilla and Brezo is Aragon 
(95). He is «un pueblo de Burgos cuando nieva, territorio aislado» 
(135), he is Albania (29): «En mi republica se practica la autarquia 
de repliegue: producir para autoabastecerse y permanecer inmodi-
ficado, al abrigo de influencias extranjeras. Porque habitar con los 
otros es la guerra y me destruye, he preferido rodearme de una di-
fusa constelacion afectiva» (29). If interior spaces are compared with 
geographical forms, the reverse is also true. A map of the Baltic Sea 
is said to have «forma de hombre arrodillado» (40). A discussion of 
a geographical study bleeds into a question of a personal nature: 
«El resto de la mafiana lo pase corrigiendo las consecuencias de un 
error de escala en un estudio de impacto: como instalar una esta-
cion espacial en las estribaciones del parque de Monfrague sin per-
turbar el equilibria. iComo instalar a una mujer de ideas fijas en 
mi vida prudente y lograr que los dos salieramos incolumes?» (24). 
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Sergio is sure that the emotive forces in which he is drowning are 
real, and he is not wrong. His conclusion is thus that they occupy 
space. Implicitly affirming Bergson's idea that sensation takes place 
where it is felt and thus that it is extensive, in supporting that all 
consciousness is something, Sergio is led to speak of his emotions 
in geographical terms: «Brezo, toda la noche estuve pensando que 
existia la emoci6n y era geografica: ocupaba un sitio, tenia longi-
tud y diametro como la barra del metro, yo podia aferrarme a ella 
para no caer» (180). Whether he does this in order to deceive him-
self as to the debilitating nature of his affective sense or as a pre-
paratory step in his intent to link his mind and world, subjective and 
objective consciousness, idealism and realism (note that he claims 
«estoy dispuesto a pasar a la acci6n») (209) matters not. What is 
important is that the geographical metaphor for body gives emo-
tions a real and extensive character. The implication is that there is 
a fundamental link between mental and cartographic space. 
Yet Sergio persists in imagining this link as a space, instead of 
recognizing the immanence of mind to cartography, instead of re-
alizing that both one and the other are simplified abstractions. Con-
sider the development of this linkage as it is explored through Ser-
gio's discussion of the geographers of perception: 
Me hallaba particularmente interesado en los ge6grafos de la 
percepci6n, una corriente que apenas habia merecido un epi-
grafe en el programa de la asignatura, pero entre cuyas apor-
taciones figuraba el «mapa mental». Oh deliciosa idea. Oh con-
cepci6n tripartita de[ mundo. No hay un dentro y un afuera, 
no hay un hombre en su casa y abajo la superficie de aveni-
das y paseos que consignan los planos, sino un hombre en su 
casa, una urdimbre de aceras en las calles y, entre las dos, un 
mapa mental o filtro que modifica el paisaje, el desnivel de las 
cuestas, las escalas ... Con un dibujante cart6grafo a su servi-
cio, cada individuo podria plasmar las imagenes de su mapa 
mental en un papel. Veriamos entonces cambiar la geometria 
de las plazas, multiplicarse o reducirse la distancia entre la 
Cibeles y la Puerta del Sol, crecer la densidad de poblaci6n de 
Africa, la extension de China, la altitud del Retiro. Con un 
cart6grafo a su disposici6n, Sergio Prim hubiera acertado a 
descubrir angulos como heridas de un papel doblado muchas 
veces, pues no ignoraba que habia fracturas en su mapa men-
tal por donde cabia irse. c:Pero c6mo accederse a los mapas 
mentales ajenos? c:C6mo sefialarlas alli? (my emphasis, 85) 
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Using a tripartite structure and the idea of a space «between» proves 
problematic for Sergio. In defining mental and cartographic space 
as inherently distinct he creates the necessity of a bridge between 
the two. And yet his vocabulary points to the city-space imagined 
by the Situationists. For Guy Debord and Asger Jorn, the apparent-
ly Cartesian-gridded space of the city existed not as a planar total-
ity but rather always mediated by the experience of the individual. 
Any individual, then, with the help of a cartographer could recon-
struct an experiential map of the living city, no longer a reification 
subject to the spectacle of modem capitalist practice, but, in Berg-
sonian terms, a circuit formed by the continuous flow of ideal con-
sciousness into real consciousness and back again. For all his dif-
ferences with the Situationists (see Harvey 1991: 429), it is this very 
circuit that Lefebvre delineates in The Production of Space (1991). 
Space is a process, a relation, just as Marx's revolution was to de-
fine capital as a relation. A radical understanding of this idea in-
volves a more complex articulation of spatial praxis than Sergio's 
dualistic affect-action model, no more complete for the inclusion of 
a «hueco» connecting space. 
It is just such a complex articulation of space that has been tak-
ing hold in the field of Geography. Theorists are recognizing the 
constructed nature of what was previously thought of as statically 
given, the mutually constituted nature of the previously isolated 
spheres of culture and of material landscape. David Harvey (2000) 
looks «From Place to Space and Back Again.» Charles Tilly (1999) 
advises us to go «toward relational analyses of political processes» 
(419). Bob Jessop (1999) asserts that the boundaries between the 
economic and the political are of cultural origin (380). Michel Fou-
cault (1975) looks at the way disciplines originate at the level of the 
individual and take on the form of repeated spatial practice. Tim 
Mitchell (1999) argues that the «state effect» arises from the mate-
rial and provides a framework for a «double-articulation» between 
the Foucaldian notion of disciplines ascending to more global con-
structions of power. Sallie Marston (2004) calls for recognition of 
the «'nexus' among» and «mutually constitutive nature of the cate-
gories» of state, culture and space (38). In «The Social Construc-
tion of Scale», Marston (2000) presents an incisive and convincing 
look into how ideas of scale, itself not ontologically given, become 
shaped by social practice. 
In fact, as Gopegui's novel suggests despite the insistence of its 
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mistaken narrator-protagonist, scale is a matter not only of global, 
supranational, national, regional, and local, but also of individual 
concern. It is no wonder that the psychologist who advises Sergio, 
Maravillas Gea, has written her thesis on «la perdida del espacio en 
los esquemas mentales: un analisis del sentimiento de desaparici6n» 
(177); geographical space and body are intimately entwined, or as 
Sergio states in a rare epiphany, «todo esta comunicado» (131, 182), 
itself an echo of what Waldo Tobler in 1970 called the First Law of 
Geography 8• Like the protagonist of John Cheever's «The Swimmer» 
who, in using an «ojo de cart6grafo» (129) as Gopegui's text men-
tions, finds that he can get home by tracing a path through the 
pools of his suburban wasteland, both the reader and the protago-
nist of La escala de los mapas discover that a movement exists which 
envelops both psychic and geographical space. Sergio links the ge-
ographical with the psychological upon declaring «las escalas no son 
patrimonio de los ge6grafos. En realidad, todo el mundo las utili-
za» (33). The partitioning of reality into levels of abstractions called 
scales finds a complement in the discussion of the layering of min-
erals (69) and the profound and simple structures of both emotions 
and extra-corporeal facts (89). In fact it appears that «todo es cues-
ti6n de escalas» (227). 
This connection between mind and geography, phrased in sca-
lar terms, manifests itself in an equivalence between maps and 
books. Essentially, Sergio points out, «el mismo sistema que rige 
para la tierra y sus mapas, rige para los hombres: escalas y signos, 
representaci6n. Los mapas de los hombres son los libros» (127). 
Completely debilitated by an overdeveloped affective sense, the ques-
tion for the interval-seeking protagonist is how to convert affect into 
action. He complains that «Nadie me puso ejercicios para aprender 
a trasladar lo imaginado a lo vivido» (169). His affective sense is so 
self-indulged that his emotions have the power to cloud the percep-
tion of space. In the following passage, Sergio touches Brezo affec-
tionately and finds the world around him distorting itself, eventually 
disappearing: «En el instante en que puse mis manos en su cuello 
comenz6 la dispersion de los objetos, se marcharon aceras y cabinas 
8 For an enlightening forum on Tobler's First Law of Geography -«everything is 
related to everything else, but near things are more related than distant things»-
the reader may wish to consult the Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 
Volume 94, June 2004, Number 2 for a series of seven authors' comments including 
a reply by Tobler himself. 
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y espejos retrovisores. Como se interrumpe el rio en la cascada ces6 
el dia» (156). Like emotions, books also have this power to immerse 
Sergio completely in the idea (127)9. This temporal metaphor works 
alongside the prevalent spatial metaphor of the «hueco» to signify 
the nexus between desire and reality manifest also in the space be-
tween books and reality. The reader wonders how Sergio will turn 
the imagined into lived experience. This at times takes a personal 
tone focusing on the small scale -Sergio modifies the space of his 
office to reflect his isolation (84). Yet, given the geographical con-
text, the reader simultaneously must ask questions of a larger 
scale-how, for example, do ideas of city-space become social praxis? 
The novel caters to these larger questions as Madrid and its sur-
rounding areas are implicated by the numerous studies of environ-
mental impact performed by the novel's geographers. Even Sergio's 
group is contracted to «evaluar el suelo no urbanizable de quince 
municipios perifericos» (46), and Sergio himself leads a study of the 
impact of «un helipuerto militar» (80) in Alnedo, «un pueblo de la 
serrania alta de Cuenca» (102). Despite his insistence to the con-
trary, he is in intimate connection with reality, taking part in the 
production of space. Nevertheless, Sergio's personal isolation and the 
fact that he caries with him a mental map of Madrid (127) have 
consequences not only for his relationship with Brezo, his other half, 
the reality to his subjectivity, the matter to his memory, but also for 
his relation with city space. Losing a connection with Brezo, with 
his outer reality, will leave a flexible mental map that will soon be-
come unmanageable. «Brezo, piano mio, te callaras y entonces Ma-
drid sea infinito, laberinto sin puertas, y no volveremos a coincidir» 
(177). Yet it is not that this connection might be lost, but rather that 
it will be clouded by the power of his affective sense 10 • 
With the above reading, we find that Sergio's mistake is creat-
ing an interval between things where there is none. That at the end 
9 The idea of stopping the world, a philosophical tenet explored in Deleuze (1988: 
139) and taken from the works of Carlos Castaneda (1968), appears in Gopegui's novel 
as well («detener el mundo» 139, 170; «detener el espacio» 176). 
10 Here Gopegui has inverted, traditional social gender roles with an end to em-
phasize larger questions of spatial process. If the story had been told with Sergio as 
the active reality and Brezo as the passive subjectivity, it would have been tempting 
to read the novel through constructions of gender --either as affirmation or critique 
of the societal roles continually negotiated by individuals. Yet Gopegui's reversal of a 
traditional and ill-formulated dichotomy that links affective with feminine and ex-
tensive with masculine pushes us away from this interpretation, instead presenting 
an illustration of a standard dichotomy of spatial production. 
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of the book Sergio dissolves into the «hueco» between the words of 
his testimony (229) means that the intellectual division between 
affect and action, books and reality, mental maps and cartographic 
maps has come to an end. Sergio is a mere vehicle for showing the 
absurdity of the divisions the human mind thinks into reality. Only 
by seeing these products of thought as such can we truly see space 
as a process, as Bergsonian real movement. We are then faced with 
«el problema del despues» (25), with the real problem of how to put 
our capability for indeterminate action to work. We find ourselves 
riding the wave of the eternal Bergsonian transition of the past into 
the present «como quien vive en lo que esta a punto de ocurrir» (92). 
CONCLUSION: THINKING SPACE 
The link between representations of places and those places 
themselves, between mental maps and cartographic maps, between 
the individual and the city, between the small and the large scale 
has an ample and accessible bibliography. Theorists such as Dear 
(2000), Foucault (1975), Harvey (1989; 1990; 1996; 2000), Jessop 
(1999), Latham and McCormack (2004), Lefebvre (1974), Mada-
nipour (1996), D. Mitchell (2000), T. Mitchell (1999), Marston (2000; 
2004), Soja (1996), Thoms (2002) and Tilly (1999) ask trenchant 
questions of the relationship between the mental and the cartograph-
ic. Taken as the philosophical basis for the understanding of the 
production of space, Bergson's works caution against simplifying the 
interaction of both material and immaterial processes and are more 
relevant than ever to geographical inquiry 11 • Gopegui's La escala de 
11 The philosopher, in fact, may be experiencing a new wave of attention in crit-
ical theory as a recent issue of the journal Culture and Organization (9.1, 2003) shows, 
to name just one example. In their essay «Time Creativity and Culture: Introducing 
Bergson» Stephen Linstead and John Mullarkey (2003) argue for the relevance of 
Bergson's work to the analysis of culture (see also Linstead 2002). Alexander Styhre's 
«Knowledge as a Virtual Asset: Bergson's Notion of Virtuality and Knowledge Organ-
ization» (2003) shows the importance of Bergson's thought to a theory of knowledge 
as process. Sean Watson attempts to bring Bergson to bear on the analysis of both 
literature and social groups in his «Bodily Entanglement: Bergson and Thresholds in 
the Sociology of Affect» (2003). Antoine Hatzenberger's «Open Society and Bolos: A 
Utopian Reading of Bergson's 'Final Remarks'» (2003) likewise finds great relevance 
of Bergson's ideas to current and alternative social organizations. Carl Power's «Free-
dom and Sociability for Bergson» (2003) suggests that «we need to re-evaluate the 
relevance and value of Bergson's thought today» (71). Bergson's importance for De-
leuze is evident not only in the cinema books but also in Bergsonism (2002) and in 
two essays of Desert Islands (2004). 
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las mapas provides a notable opportunity to assess the relevance of 
these two approaches to spatial process. Sergio Prim's strict dichot-
omies (of affect vs. action, of subjectivity vs. objectivity, of idealism 
vs. realism) serve as a warning of the dangers inherent in partition-
ing the movement of spatial production into material and immate-
rial components. Scholarship must be able to reassess its intentions 
in order to see how these categories become abstracted out of the 
flux of experience only through the work of the human intellect. 
Ultimately, the fusion of Cultural Geography, Bergsonism and 
Gopegui's text suggests, as do Latham & McCormack (2004), that 
«we need to consider more fully how the process of abstraction 
actually allows us to draw out, and also to become implicated in, 
the excessive force of materiality» (707). 
WORKS CITED 
Bergson, Henri. Matter and Memory. Trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Pal-
mer. London, G. Allen; New York: Macmillan [1896)1912. 
-. Creative Evolution. Trans. A. Mitchell. Mineola NY: Dover Publications [1907)1998. 
Bohm, David. Thought as a System. London: Routledge, 1994. 
-. Wholeness and the Implicate Order. London: Routledge, 1980. 
-. On Creativity. Ed. Lee Nichol. London: Routledge, 1998. 
-. On Dialogue. Ed. Lee Nichol. London. Routledge, 1999. 
Castaneda, Carlos. The Teachings of Don Juan; a Yaqui Way of Knowledge. Berkeley: 
U of California P, 1968. 
Cheever, John. «The Swimmer.» The Swimmer and The Death of Justina. New York: 
Caedmon, 1981. 
Dear, Michael. The Postmodern Urban Condition. Oxford: Blackwell, 2000. 
Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophre-
nia. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1987. 
Deleuze, Gilles. Cinema I: The Movement-Image. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara 
Habberjam. London: Athlone, 1986. 
-. Bergsonism. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson & Barbara Habberjam. New York: Zone 
Books, 2002. 
-. Desert Islands and Other Texts 1953-1974. Ed. David Lapoujade. Trans. Michael 
Taormina. Los Angeles & New York: Semiotext(e), 2004. 
Drinkwater, Judith. «'La soledad de las islas': towards a topography of identity in Belen 
Gopegui, La escala de los mapas, and Juan Jose Millas, La soledad era esto.» The 
Scripted Self Textual Identities in Contemporary Spanish Narrative. Warminster UK: 
Aris & Phillips, 1995. 99-113. 
Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish. New York: Penguin Books, 1978. 
Gopegui, Belen. La escala de los mapas. Barcelona: Anagrama, 1993. 
-. Tocarnos la cara. Barcelona: Anagrama, 1995. 
-. La conquista del aire. Barcelona: Anagrama, 1998. 
-. Lo real. Barcelona: Anagrama, 2001. 
-. El !ado frio de la almohada. Barcelona: Anagrama, 2004. 
Harvey, David. The Urban Experience. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1989. 
-30-
ON MENTAL AND CARTOGRAPHIC SPACE: BELEN GOPEGUI'S LA ESCALA DE LOS MAPAS 
The Condition of Postmodernity. Oxford: Blackwell, 1990. 
-. Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference. London: Blackwell, 1996. 
-. Spaces of Hope. Berkeley: U of California P, 2000. 
«Afterword.» The Production of Space. Henri Lefebvre. Trans. Donald Nicholson-Smi-
th. Oxford: Blackwell, 1991. 425-434. 
Hatzenberger, Antoine. «Open Society and Bolos: A Utopian Reading of Bergson's 
'Final Remarks.'» Culture and Organization 9.1 (2003): 43-58. 
Herrero, Gerardo, dir. El principio de Arqu{medes. Perl. Marta Belaustegui, Roberto 
Enriquez, Blanca Oteyza, Alberto Jimenez. Alta Films 2004. 
Las razanes de mis amigos. Perl. Marta Belaustegui, Sergi Calleja, Joel Joan. Alta Films 
2000. 
Jessop, Bob. «Narrating the Future of the National Economy and the National State: 
Remarks on Remapping Regulation and Reinventing Governance.» Ed. George 
Steinmetz. State/Culture: State-Formation After the Cultural Turn. Ithaca & Lon-
don: Cornell UP, 1999. 378-405. 
Krishnamurti, Jiddu and David Bohm. The Limits of Thought. London: Routledge, 1999. 
The Ending of Time. San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1985. 
Latham, A. & D. McCormack. «Moving Cities: Rethinking the Materialities of Urban 
Geographies.» Progress in Human Geography 28.6 (2004): 701-724. 
Lefebvre, Henri. The Production of Space. Trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith. Oxford, 
OX, UK; Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell, 1991. 
-. «The Right to the City.» Ed. & Trans., E. Kofman & E. Lebas. Writing on Cities. 
Oxford: Blackwell, 1968. 63-181. 
Libet, Benjamin & David Ingle, Steve J. Heims, reply by Oliver Sacks. «'In the River 
of Consciousness': An Exchange.» The New York Review of Books 51.6 (April 8, 
2004): 84-85. 
Linstead, Stephen & John Mullarkey. «Time, Creativity and Culture: Introducing 
Bergson.» Culture and Organization 9.1 (2003): 3-13. 
Linstead, Stephen. «Organization as Reply: Henri Bergson and Causal Organization 
Theory.» Organization 9.1 (2002): 95-111. 
Madanipour, Ali. Design of Urban Space: an Inquiry into a Socio-spatial Process. Chi-
chester: Wiley, 1996. 
Marston, Sallie. «The Social Construction of Scale.» Progress in Human Geography 
24.2 (2000): 219-242. 
-. «What's culture got to do with it?: A response to Jakobsen and Van Deusen.» 
Political Geography 23.1 (2004): 35-39. 
McNamara, Patrick. «Bergson's 'Matter and Memory' and Modern Selectionist Theo-
ries of Memory.» Brain and Cognition 30 (1996): 215-31. 
Mitchell, Don. Cultural Geography: a Critical Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell, 2000. 
-. The Right to the City: Social Justice and the Fight for Public Space. New York: The 
Guilford Press, 2003. 
Mitchell, Tim. «Society, economy, and the state effect.» State/culture: state-formation 
after the cultural turn. G. Steinmetz, Ed. Ithaca & London: Cornell UP, 1999. 76-97. 
Nabokov, Vladimir. Ada; or, Ardor: a family chronicle. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969. 
Pasolini, Pier Paolo. Heretical Empiricism. Ed. Louise K. Barnett. Bloomington: India-
na UP, 1988. 
Perez, Janet. «Tradition, Renovation, Innovation: The Novels of Belen Gopegui.» ALEC 
28.1 (2003): 115-138. 
Power, Carl. «Freedom and Sociability for Bergson.» Culture and Organization 9.1 
(2003): 59-71. 
Pullman, Bernard. The Atom in the History of Human Thought. Trans. Axel Reisinger. 
Oxford: Oxford UP, 1998. 
-31-
ESPANA CONTEMPORANEA 
Sacks, Oliver. «In the River of Consciousness.» The New York Review of Books 51.1 
(January 15, 2004): 41-44. 
Soja, Edward W. Thirdspace. Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined 
Places. Oxford: Blackwell, 1996. 
Styhre, Alexander. «Knowledge as a Virtual Asset: Bergson's Notion of Virtuality and 
Organizational Knowledge.» Culture and Organization 9.1 (2003): 15-26. 
Thoms, David. The Transformation of Cities: Urban Theory and Urban Life. Houndmills, 
Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2002. 
Tilly, Charles. «Epilogue: now where?» State/culture: state-formation after the cultural 
turn. G. Steinmetz, ed. Ithaca & London: Cornell UP, 1999. 407-419. 
Voloshinov, Valentin. Marxism and the Philosophy of Language. New York: Seminar 
Press, 1973. 
Watson, Sean. «Bodily Entanglement: Bergson and Thresholds in the Sociology of 
Affect.» Culture and Organization 9 .1 (2003 ): 27-41. 
- 32-
